Inside The Lobby
(Page 2 of 4)
It is doubtful if any member has ever changed a vote because of two or three meals. Days and nights of constant dinners, parties, attention, favors, and celebrations do, however, create bonds of friendship and companionship in what for many legislators is a lonely town. It is terribly hard to vote against a friend, and to some extent, everyone is influenced by that personal touch. The sole reason for all this effort on the lobbyist's part is indeed to make a friend of the legislator, to gain access to his office, and once there, to make his pitch.
Lobbying is much more sophisticated today than it was in the 1950's. Bourbon, beefsteaks, and blondes were three formidable weapons in the lobbyist's arsenal then. Not far out South Congress Avenue were two of the better whorehouses in Texas; many of the girls were working their way through UT and were not your average hookers. Hattie's and Peggy's were lively on a Sunday night, and lobbyists gladly followed along to pick up the members' tabs.
Today, the few hookers are free lancers whose business is going down. One young lady interviewed said, "Yeah, I get an occasional legislator or businessman but they're older and just get drunk and pass out. I still get the hundred bucks though, don't you worry about that."
Because it's expensive and, more importantly, because of the Sharpstown scandal's effect on such ostentation, junketeering has been throttled the past few years. Gone are the days of lobby-paid trips to Keeneland Race Track in Lexington, Ky., and mass migrations to Matamoros or Juarez under the auspices of inspecting the state's coastal lands or Texas Western College. This year, unless you wanted to view the Houston Ship Channel courtesy of the Chamber of Commerce, it was stay in Austin and gut it out.
Gifts to legislators have also dropped off sharply. No longer is there a flood of turkeys, transistor radios, packages of imported cheeses, whiskey, etc.
For the legislators and for most of the lobby, the 1973 session was just unpleasant and exhausting. As a lobbyist from Houston put it: "It was an isometric session. You pulled and strained as hard as you could and got nowhere. There was never a game plan, but you kept going back everyday hoping you could catch hold of what was going on." Reuben Senterfitt, the powerful lobbyist for the utility industry, was overheard saying, "I did okay this time, but I dreaded every day going to the Capitol and doing business."
What was going on was an attempt by 77 new House members and 14 new Senators to deal with confusion, distrust, and two presiding officers who chose to preside rather than lead; and to try in the process to pass some legislation.
In the spirit of ree-form, Speaker Price Daniel, Jr. announced he would be speaker only one term. The immediate and continuing result of that pronouncement was that an immediate speaker's race was created, and from the first day forward, trust among House members was minimal at best. This, in turn, meant no floor leadership. If the speaker doesn't provide strong direction, it must come from experienced, respected members on the House floor. Those who tried were suspected of cutting deals and furthering their own cause.
In the Senate, things weren't so bad. A slightly smaller percentage of freshmen, a lighter work load, and experienced men chairing crucial committees helped. Lt. Governor Bill Hobby didn't. To campaign and be elected lieutenant governor in a state whose Constitution makes him the most powerful presiding Senate officer in any of the 50 states, and then to disavow and turn away from this authority, is a waste.
No one, however, accused either chamber of laziness. House and Senate members began with a mole-like diligence, burrowing through Saturday meetings as early as March and attending non-controversial committee meetings that often lasted until the early morning. By the session's end, the unfortunate result was a totally exhausted legislative membership. So many House members were vowing not to run again that the turnover in 1975 may be 25 or 30 more than the normal average of 47.
Despite problems, changes, and realignments of old political alliances, work was accomplished, bills passed and defeated, and in the end, there were definite winners and losers among the lobby.
The reason many thousands of dollars are spent lobbying the legislature is because the stakes are enormous. Almost without exception, every industry and business is affected by decisions made every two years in Austin. The basic rule for the lobbyist is that money is the root of all lobbying: Keep the client from paying it out; pave the way to bring it in.
For the men representing the major industries—oil and gas, beer and liquor, utilities, chemicals, railroads, trucks, sulphur—the overriding task is to avoid taxation. This they did and, therefore, were winners.
Other associations had specific battles to fight: Kill this bill, pass this one, amend this one. Some did and some didn't.
One spectacular fight, one in which there were definite losers and winners, involved Bill Abington, the lobbyist for Texas Mid-Continent Oil and Gas Association, whom we left waiting in the Senate gallery for a key vote. Abington's battle contained all the elements of a good novel: forceful characters, strong developing plot, a large purse at stake, and a smashing dramatic climax.
In one corner: Texas Mid-Continent Oil and Gas Association, made up of 3000 members of almost all the independent and major oil companies in Texas, and considered the strongest industrial lobby in Texas; the Texas Manufacturing Association; 12 major Chamber of Commerce groups; four environmental groups; 32 Texas newspaper editorial endorsements.
In the other corner: Senator Peyton McKnight, Tyler; several independent oil men, notably Wesley West of Houston and Robert Payne of Dallas; the Permian Basin Petroleum Association, a small association of independent oil men headquartered in Midland.
At issue was the passage of the oil field unitization bill (HB 311). Unitization is a complicated concept, but basically the bill would have allowed 75 per cent of the operators in a given oil field to require all operators in that field to pay for, and share proportionately the benefits of, secondary recovery methods in fields where normal drilling could no longer efficiently recover oil.
Senator McKnight's opposition to the bill was well known. His view was that the voluntary unitization law in Texas was already working in over 400 fields and that this new bill would force smaller oil operators with good producing wells into unitization with a larger field of less productive units. The energy crisis (used by supporters to gather votes for the bill) is a phony issue, McKnight claimed, because, 1) the only way to solve the crisis is to find more oil reserves and increase the capacity of existing refineries and, 2) the secondary recovery method is not guaranteed to work and may not contribute a thing.
The Mid-Continent Oil and Gas boys made their first mistake early in the session. McKnight felt his position was hopeless, so he offered to work out some amendments to the bill which would help protect the small operators. Mid-Continent refused to discuss compromise with McKnight (as it later turned out, a big mistake).
The lobby had no trouble in the House. Opposition was fragmented; the bill's sponsors, Dave Finney of Ft. Worth and DeWitt Hale of Corpus Christi, were both veteran, respected leaders. One seemingly innocuous amendment was tacked on involving a relatively inexpensive severance compensation program for laid-off oil workers. This was done because of the successful work of the president of the Texas Oil and Chemical Union, Morris Aikins, and resulted in shifting 15 to 20 labor votes in the House. More importantly, Senator D. Roy Harrington of Port Arthur, a labor man, then changed sides and supported the measure. The bill passed the House 103-36, thus strengthening the confidence of the lobby.
McKnight dug in for an all-out battle. His strategy was to delay consideration of the bill as long as possible, giving him time to explain the bill point-by-point to other Senators. As the only oil man in the upper house, his words carried much weight.
He insisted on a full presentation of testimony before the Natural Resources Committee and those hearings lasted over a month. When the bill arrived from the House, he insisted on hearings on the House amendments, then presented a series of unsuccessful committee amendments that took two more weeks. When the bill's sponsors tried to get it out of committee, McKnight surprised the committee with a rule requiring a transcript of all hearings prior to final action, delaying passage for another week.
McKnight had another opponent, one that really curled his socks. Lt. Gov. Bill Hobby broke his trance, and for the first and only time during the session, actively worked the floor for a major bill, urging his colleagues to vote "aye." Hobby needlessly tweaked McKnight's nose by refusing to re-refer a minor bill from an unfriendly to a more favorable committee, a common Senatorial courtesy usually granted from the floor.
McKnight fought back, refusing to back down to the presiding officer. He announced that "Billy Hobby may well have an East Texas opponent next year."
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